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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the interactions between wages in the public sector, the traded 
private sector and the sheltered private sector in ten EU Transition Countries and 
its relationship to international competitiveness during the decade 2000-2010. The 
theoretical literature on wage spillovers suggests that the internationally traded 
sector should be the leader in wage setting, with sheltered and public sector (the 
non-traded sector) wages adjusting. Using a Cointegrated VAR approach we show 
that a large heterogeneity across countries is present, with non-traded sectors 
wages often being leaders in wage determination or at least affecting traded sector 
wages in the short run. In some countries, public sector wages are weakly 
exogenous, with the private sectors adjusting. This result is relevant from a policy 
perspective since wage spillovers, leading to costs growing faster than productivity, 
may affect the international cost competitiveness of the traded sector. 
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1. Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to study the interactions and spillovers between wages in different 
sectors. In particular, we analyze the interplay in wage determination in three broad sectors: the 
open (internationally traded) sector, the closed or “sheltered sector”, which can also be called the 
market non-traded sector, and the public sector, also called the non-market non-traded sector. 
The focus of this work is on Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) that have recently 
joined the European Union. 
This issue is relevant for several reasons. First, public sector employment is large and relevant: in 
the OECD, around 25% of the work force is employed in the public sector. Second, wage spillovers 
across sectors may lead to wage costs growing faster than productivity and this may affect the 
international cost competitiveness of the country's tradable sectors. In particular, theoretical 
models generally assume that the traded sector is leader in wage determination and there is 
mobility of labour across sectors which, in turn, ensures wage equalization. This is assumed, for 
example, by Froot and Rogoff [1995] and the so-called Scandinavian Model of wage determination 
(Aukrust [1970], see Section 3). If these models hold, during the process of catching-up excess 
inflation will be witnessed and the real exchange rate will appreciate, but, on the other hand, only 
wages in the non-traded sector should grow faster than productivity and therefore 
competitiveness should not be harmed. However, it can also happen that wage bargaining in the 
non-traded sector – which is not subject to international competition – and in the public sector – 
which is influenced by political rather than productivity considerations – may lead to higher 
outcomes and, in turn, push traded sector wages up. Testing wage leadership in the case of 
transition countries is important because they are in the process of catching up: entry in the EU, 
which also fostered international labour mobility, is likely to have influenced wage determination 
in these countries, and it is possible that prices and wages converge to the western european level 
faster than productivity, thus leaving room for competitiveness losses. As long as the leader in 
wage setting is the traded sector, this problem might be less relevant. But if this is not the case, 
increased labor mobility together with union pressures might lead to a a decoupling of real and 
nominal convergence, i.e. nominal convergence could occur faster than real convergence. From a 
policy perspective, this would be a worrisome result since we could expect catching-up to occur at 
the cost of large international imbalances. 
The contribution of this paper is threefold: first, it outlines three alternative models of wage 
determination which we are likely to find in practice; second, while there is limited existing 
literature on public/private wage spillovers. No empirical work to date, to our knowledge, studies 
the issue from the three-sector perspective that is adopted here. Finally, this is the first work on 
the topic which focuses on transition countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature on wage spillovers across the 
public and private sector. Section 3 presents three alternative models of wage determination and 
causality. Section 4 outlines the empirical model, a Cointegrated VAR; section 5 describes the data 
set and section 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Related literature on wage spillovers 
The literature on wage spillovers across sectors, in particular private and public wages, is quite 
scarce. Theoretical models generally assume that public wages are exogenous or follow the same 
pattern as private wages (Quadrini and Trigari [2007], Ardagna [2007]). Demekas and Kontolemis 
[2000], instead, in a static model show that public wages can affect private sector wages through 
the labor supply channel: when public wages increase, workers move to that sector, and private 
firms are forced to increase wages too. 
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As far as the direction of causality is concerned, the main theoretical reference is the so-called 
Scandinavian model of wage determination (Aukrust [1970]). This model assumes that the sector 
that is open to international competition is the leader in wage setting since productivity should 
increase faster in the traded goods sector and firms there cannot increase wages above 
productivity in order to avoid losing competitiveness1. In this sense, also public sector wages 
should be led by private sector wages. Evidence in favor the Scandinavian Model was found by 
Aukrust for Norway, the U.S. and France, while Bemmels and Zaidi [1990] successfully applied it to 
Canada.  
However, this model has been found to be at odds with more recent data. Ultimately, the results 
seem to be country-dependent. Demekas and Kontolemis [2000] find weak exogeneity of 
government wages over private wages. Jacobsson and Ohlsson [1994], in a Vector Error Correction 
Model for Sweden, find long-run wage leadership of the private sector, thus confirming the 
predictions of the Scandinavian model, but Friberg [2007], using a broader sectoral 
decomposition2 does not find evidence of the Scandinavian model for Sweden. Christou et al. 
[2007] show a bidirectional causality relationship between private and public sector wages in 
Romania using monthly wages over the period 1993-2006. 
Lamo et al. [2008] used several empirical methods to study the co-movement and causality 
relationship between private and public wages using annual data for 18 OECD countries (plus the 
Euro Area as a whole), finding that private and public wages generally do not decouple and the 
former seem to exert a stronger influence on the latter than the reverse; moreover, they find that 
prices seem to play an important role in the transmission of wage leadership. 
None of the cited works is applied to transition countries (with the exeption of Christou et al.), 
and, more importantly, none clearly decomposes the private sector into a traded and non-traded 
sector, which is relevant when we want to understand the role of wage spillovers in affecting 
competitiveness. In fact, as we will see in the next section, not only a leading role of public sector 
wages but also of non-traded goods sector wages can lead to traded sector wages growing faster 
than productivity and thus harm the country's international competitiveness. 
 
3. Three competing theories of wage determination 
When dealing with intersectoral wage spillovers, theoretical models generally assume that the 
leader in wage determination is the sector that is exposed to international competition, i.e. the 
traded sector. However, as it was outlined in the previous section, the results obtained by the 
empirical literature are often at odds with this hypothesis. Alternative models of intersectoral 
wage linkages can therefore be imagined. 
In this section we will outline three alternative theories of wage determination and intersectoral 
wage spillovers. This will allow us to come up with testable hypotheses that will be taken to the 
data. The first model is the main theoretical reference as far as intersectoral wage linkages and 
expected causality is concerned, and it is the so-called “Scandinavian Model” of inflation, which 
was first developed by Aukrust [1970]3. The Scandinavian Model rests on three fundamental 
assumptions: (1) the different sectors in the economy can be classified as either traded (exposed) 
sectors or nontraded (sheltered) sectors; (2) wage increases in the traded sectors can be expected 
                                                          
1
 An outline of this model is presented in the next section. 
2
 In particular, he distinguishes between private sector, manufacturing sector, construction, wholesale and retail 
trade, financial sector, central government and county/municipal government. 
3
 Aukrust [1970] first developed this model to describe price dynamics in Norway, and tested it on that country. 
However, Aukrust’s model was applied to other countries’ data to test for intersectoral wage linkages: France, USA 
and Australia (Aukrust [1977]), Canada (Bemmels and Zaidi [1990]), Sweden (Frieberg et al. [2004], Frieberg [2007], 
Jacobson and Ohlsson [1994]). 
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to be transmitted to wage increases in the non-traded sectors of the economy, and therefore 
wage decisions are not taken simultaneously; (3) the exchange rate is fixed. In the original model 
we have two sectors (traded, T, and nontraded, N) and two countries (home, H, and foreign, F). 
We add the public sector as a non-traded, non-market sector and label it P. The timing structure of 
the model is pictured in figure 1, panel (a). 
In this highly stylized model, nominal wages in the traded sector are determined by the 
productivity in that sector and the prices obtainable internationally for the output of those firms4: 
 
                            (3.1) 
 
where cT,t is productivity and ηT represents stationary deviations from this long-run equilibrium 
relation. Labor is mobile across sectors; for this reason wage equalization occurs: 
 
                               (3.2) 
                               (3.3) 
 
where i.1 ≥ 0, i = N,P are parameters describing the degree of wage adaptability across sectors. 
The Scandinavian model concludes that not only should wages in different sectors co-move, but 
that transmission of wage shocks should be one to one, a testable hypothesis that we will term 
“full wage adaptability”. In other words, according to the Scandinavian Model the deviations from 
equilibrium, j, j = N,P,T should be stationary, N.1 = P.1 = 0 and N.1= P.1 = 1. 
Finally, the firms in the traded sector set the prices for their goods and services accordingly, in 
order to avoid losses5, so that 
 
                           (3.4) 
 
As a result, non-traded goods prices will increase more than traded goods prices, a conclusion 
which is shared with the so-called “internal version” of the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis.  
 
An alternative argument may be relevant for transition countries that have entered the European 
Union. The catching up process of transition countries towards western european levels, in terms 
of productivity and price level, has been documented in many studies on the so-called Balassa-
Samuelson effect6. However, when a country joins the European Union, the liberalization of labor 
mobility across countries should itself foster wage convergence within the Union. This, in turn, can 
be due to convergence in productivity, but also to migration of labor to countries with higher wage 
levels or increased union pressures for wage raises. In the latter two cases, wage increases can 
harm the competitiveness of the country if they are above productivity growth. 
As long as the traded sector is the leader in wage determination, pressures due to international 
competition will avoid wage increases in excess of productivity.  
 
                                                          
4
 The model outlined below heavily draws on Aukrust [1970]. 
5
 One additional assumption that we have left impliciti s that productivity growth is higher in the traded sector than in 
the non-traded sector. This assumption, which is empirically sound, is also at the basis of the so-called Baumol-Bowen 
effect that the price wedge between non-tradables and tradables should be commoving with productivity. If this 
assumption did not hold, then we could either have pN growing more than pT (if firms in N set prices under mark-up 
pricing) or less than pT (if there is pricing-to-market in N). 
6
 A small subset includes Mihaljek and Klau [2001], Egert [2002°, 2002b, 2002c, 2007], Fischer [2004], Dobrinsky 
[2006] and Staher [2010]. 
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Figure 1. Three competing models of wage spillovers 
 
But alternative models of intersectoral wage spillovers could be present, and the empirical analysis 
in the next section will prove that this might indeed be the case. 
As it was pointed out by Friberg [2007], non-traded sector firms operate in a less competitive 
environment, since they are not subject to international competition: therefore, wage bargaining 
in non-traded sectors may lead to higher outcomes, ceteris paribus. But this is not the only issue, 
since in the present paper we further divide non-traded sector wages between the market non-
traded and non-market non-traded (public) sector. Theoretical models of public sector wage 
setting generally assume that wages for public employees are set exogenously or, as in Demekas 
and Kontolemis [2000], that the government maaximizes an objective function in public goods 
provision and public wages (a form of political patronage). In this sense, also wage bargaining in 
the public sector may lead to higher outcomes, depending on the political pressure that public 
employees are able to exert on the government. If the mobility of labor across sectors is high and 
therefore wages tend to equalize, a leading role in wage setting of either the public sector or the 
non-traded sector can harm international competitiveness. 
We can sketch models of wage determination which are parallel to the Scandinavian model for 
these two cases. 
A model with the non-traded sector leading is pictured in figure 1, panel (b). For practical reasons, 
we will call it the “wage mark-up model”. Nominal wages in the non-traded sector are set 
according to productivity in that sector, the prices that firms can obtain on the internal market, 
and the mark-up on productivity that unions are able to extract from employers: 
 
                              (3.5) 
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pressures for wage equalization across sectors due to free intersectoral labor mobility, as in the 
previous case, will make sure that wages in T and P adjust to wN: 
 
                               (3.6) 
 
                               (3.7) 
 
where again T.2 = P.2 = 0 and T.2= P.2 = 1 if full wage adaptability holds and j, j = N,P,T are 
stationary i.i.d. disturbances. 
The firms in the traded sector, then, will set the prices of their goods according to the level of 
wages and the productivity in the sector: 
 
                    7       (3.8) 
 
and this in turn causes real appreciation. Thus, unless a nominal exchange rate depreciation 
occurs, it will lead to the country's firms becoming less competitive on the international markets8. 
In this case, the presence of low wage adaptability (T.2 < 1 ) might offset (at least partially) the 
negative effect of public sector wages on competitiveness. 
Finally, Figure 1, panel (c) pictures the case of the public sector leading the other two. We will call 
this the “envy-effect model” (Friberg *2007+, Strom *1995+).In this case, we assume following 
Ardagna [2007] and Quadrini and Trigari [2007] that the public sector wages are predetermined: 
 
      ̅         (3.9) 
 
where  ̅      , i= N,T, i.e. public wages lead wage determination and they grow faster than 
productivity in the other sectors. As in the previous cases, wage equalization then occurs: 
 
                               (3.10) 
 
                               (3.11) 
 
Again, full wage adaptability holds if i.3=1, i=N,T. As in the previous case, the consequences for 
the domestic firms' international competitiveness might be serious due to traded goods prices 
growing faster than productivity. Moreover, since wages in both market sectors (N and T) are 
growing ahead of productivity, in this latter case the result in terms of CPI inflation will be more 
serious than in the previous cases. 
Albeit highly stylized, these models offer us an idea of the scenarios we are likely to find in an 
empirical analysis of wage spillovers and leve us with clear testable hypotheses to find out which 
model fits best in describing the wage setting process in a specific country. 
 
4. The Empirical Model 
                                                          
7
 The implicit assumption here is that               . 
8
 In order to avoid losing market share, firms in T might keep prices unchanged for some time, but this strategy would 
not be sustainable since i twill generate losses. Alternatively, they might reduce employment and/or try to push 
productivity up, for example by eliminating previous slack in the work process (see, for example, Juselius and Ordonez 
[2009]). However, to be able to account for this we would need a more general theoretical and empirical model which 
is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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The ideal empirical model to test the assumptions embedded in the theoretical model sketched in 
the previous section, for reasons that will be clear shortly, is a Cointegrated VAR as developed by 
Johansen [1988, 1995]. The main advantage of the CVAR is that it is a completely data-driven 
approach, which puts reality ahead of theory, and can therefore challenge – as it has been proved 
in several recent works9 – theoretical macro models which have often been proved to fail to 
explain many empirical facts. Instead of pre-specifying the correct economic model from the 
outset, by using the CVAR we “let the data speak”. At the same time, the CVAR does not have the 
drawback of Structural VARs which, in order to be identified, require a priori restrictions that are 
generally not testable. All restrictions imposed on the CVAR are testable, and this makes it a more 
robust tool for econometric analysis with respect to SVARs. One drawback of the CVAR is that it is 
quite data-demanding, which can be a problem when we deal with transition countries given the 
reduced data availability. However, in this specific case, given the dimension of the VAR (three 
variables) and the characteristics of the series (see next section) this problem is less relevant. 
Suppose we have a vector of p variables in time series. When the p variables, in levels, are 
nonstationary and integrated of order 1, I(1), their first difference will be I(0). Moreover, if two or 
more variables are I(1) but their linear combination is I(0), they are said to be cointegrated ( or 
CI(1,0) ). The CVAR, as we will see, has the variables in first differences as dependent variables but 
is simply a reparametrization of the VAR. Therefore, the value of the likelihood is the same and 
there is no information loss in moving from the VAR to the Cointegrated (or Vector Error 
Correction) counterpart. 
A Cointegrated VAR model of order n with p variables, is defined as: 
 
      ̃                                             (4.1) 
 
where D is a vector of dummy variables (seasonals and other unrestricted dummies), m is a vector 
of constant terms10 and W is the (pxp) covariance matrix of (white noise) residuals. Γj, j=1,...,n are 
the matrices of the short-run coefficients. When variables are I(1) and cointegrated, the matrix P 
will be of rank r < p, where r is the number of (long-run) cointegration relations. Therefore, the P 
matrix can be decomposed as: 
 
    ̃     ̃  [           ];  
 
  ̃    [            ]  
 
where 1 represents a constant restricted to lie in the cointegration relation, Ds are dummies that 
do not cancel in the cointegration relations and t is a linear trend. The b’s are called the 
cointegration relations while the a are the loadings. In other terms, the long run (stationary) 
relations that characterize the variables are the β's, while the α's show how each variable adjusts 
to disequilibria in the corresponding long-run relation. The coefficients in the a  and  b matrices 
will not be, in general, identified (i.e. we have an infinite number of matrices a and b that, if 
multiplied, are equal to P); in order to achieve identification, we will need to impose restrictions 
on b. A Cointegrated VAR model is empirically identified when r-1 restrictions are imposed on each 
long-run relation. If the number of restrictions is larger, the model is overidentified and such 
restrictions are testable. 
                                                          
9
 See, for example, Juselius and Franchi [2007]. 
10
 Notice that an unrestricted constant in the differences is equivalent to a linear trend in the levels of the variables. 
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Including a linear term (the time trend t ) in the cointegration relations can be useful when 
variables in the system are trending and trends do not cancel in the cointegrating relations; the 
constant instead allows for a non-zero mean in the relation. 
The CVAR, in sum, says that the changes in the variables in each period are given by adjustments 
to equilibrium relations and the effect of past changes in the variables of the system; all 
contemporaneous effects in the CVAR are in the covariance matrix; i.e. the CVAR is a reduced form 
model. 
Moreover, the CVAR classifies the variables in r long-run relations by which the system is pulled 
and p-r common stochastic trends, by which the system is pushed. In other words, when the rank 
is r, the shocks in the equations of the VAR can be rewritten as r transitory shocks (i.e. shocks that 
cause disequilibria which are gradually absorbed through adjustment to the long-run relations) 
and p – r permanent shocks. We can therefore re-write the CVAR in the so-called common trends 
representation: 
 
    ∑                                 ̃ 
 
     (4.2) 
 
where Dp are permanent (shift) dummies and 
 
           
       ̃          (4.3) 
 
where  and  are the p x (p – r) orthogonal complements of  and  describing the common 
stochastic trends,   ∑ , and their loadings. 
If a variable is found to be weakly exogenous, i.e. it does not adjust to any cointegrating relation11, 
then the shocks to that variable are identified as one of the common stochastic trends of the 
system. In other words, the weakly exogenous variable “causes” movements in the other 
variables. 
 
It should now be clear why the Cointegrated VAR model is a natural candidate to test empirically 
the predictions of the theoretical model sketched in the previous section. Theoretical models on 
wage determination make precise statements on the long-run relations as well as the causal links 
between wages in different sectors. 
The “Scandinavian Model” and also the Froot and Rogoff *1995+ model of the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect state that the open sector should be the driving force of the system, since on one hand 
productivity grows faster in this sector (as it has been empirically observed), and on the other 
hand it faces international competitiveness and therefore wages should increase in step with 
productivity to make sure that prices to not grow and there are no losses in competitiveness. 
Freedom of movement of labor across sectors, then, makes sure that wages are equalized. 
The hypothesis of wage equalization (or, more precisely, constancy of the wage ratio) implies that 
in a model including wages in the three sectors (industry, services and public administration) we 
should be able to find two cointegrating (long-run) relations and one common trend12. The 
coefficients in the cointegration relation should satisfy long-run homogeneity, i.e. we should find 
one-to-one long-run relations and the constant in the cointegration vectors should be zero. Finally, 
in the Scandinavian Model, the common trend should be identified with shocks to industry wages, 
i.e. industry wages should be weakly exogenous. 
                                                          
11
 This amounts to testing that the corresponding row in the  matrix is zero. 
12
 Moreover, the model should be specified with an unrestricted constant and and no trend, since the presence of a 
trend in the cointegrating relation would imply that one sector has been gaining purchasing power with respect to the 
others. 
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Table 1. Testable hypothesis on wage spillovers 
Model Leader 
Wage 
adaptability 
hypothesis 
Cointegration 
Rank 
Wage 
equalization 
hypothesis 
Granger non-
Causality 
1. Scandinavian Model wT N = P = 1 2 N.1=N.1=0 
  
   
→    
  
   
→    
2. Wage mark-up model wN T = P = 1  T.2=P.2=0 
  
   
→    
  
   
→    
3. Envy-effect model wP N = T = 1  N.3=T.3=0 
  
   
→    
  
   
→    
  
On the other hand, if the hypothesis of one-to-one relations (coefficients in the β – vector equal to 
1) is rejected, this is interpreted as a low wage adaptability between the sectors considered (see 
Friberg [2007]). If less than two cointegration relations are found, this means that there is more 
than one common trend affecting the wages: in other words, a weaker form of our three 
theoretical models holds. For example, if both Services and Industry are found to be weakly 
exogenous, with public sector wages adjusting, this would imply that the (market) traded and non-
traded sector wages are subject to different kinds of shocks, and also a lower mobility of labour 
across sectors is present: otherwise wage equalization would hold. By classifying the model into 
pulling and pushing forces, we will be able to identify how the wage shocks load into the three 
different sectors. If the weak exogeneity of traded sector wages does not hold, the empirical 
model suggests that the Scandinavian model is not a good approximation of wage dynamics in the 
country under analysis. 
In other terms, absence of weak exogeneity of wT would imply that the traded sector has not been 
a driving force in wage determination, and rather it has been influenced by shocks to the other 
sectors, leaving room for competitiveness loss if wages have grown more than productivity. 
Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses embedded in the theoretical models outlined in Section 3 
within the Cointegrated VAR framework. 
 
5. The Data and empirical results 
Our dataset contains quarterly data from 2000Q1 until 2010Q2 for ten Central and Eastern 
European Countries that have joined the European Union in one of the two waves of 2004 and 
2007 (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia). The time sample was chosen in order to make sure to have data for all 
countries, as well as excluding data from the very first years after independence which might be 
less reliable or, for what concerns the consumer price index, depend heavily on price 
administration. 
There are three wage series for each country, Industry (proxying the traded sector), Services 
(proxying the market non-traded sector) and Public Administration (the non-market, non-traded 
sector)13. While the definition of the Public Sector (wages in public administration, defence and 
compulsory social security) is not really debatable, some hypotheses had necessarily to be done in 
order to define the traded and non-traded sector. To this end, we have followed a common 
practice in the literature on the Balassa-Samuelson effect to identify the traded sector with 
industry (excluding construction, which is not unanimously treated in the literature) and the 
                                                          
13
 The exact definition of the series and the sources is given in Appendix 1. 
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market nontraded sector with Services of the business economy14. Agriculture is excluded from 
the sample as agricultural prices heavily rely on state support and price administration, and are 
influenced by policies as the CAP in the EU. 
Finally, the wage indexes are deflated using the Harmonized CPI index. This is done in order to 
concentrate on the relationship between real wages, excluding price shocks from the model. 
Most of the empirical works on this issue define wages as compensation per employee in the 
corresponding sector, calculated as compensation of employees divided by the number of workers 
in that sector; however, these data are only available on an annual basis and the available time 
series for transition countries are too short to use annual data15. The dimension of the VARs 
estimated in this paper makes the use of quarterly data suitable; moreover, unlike other long-run 
equilibrium relations, deviations from a long-run equilibrium of wage series are generally less 
persistent, and therefore 11 years represent a long enough time span to detect cointegration. 
Finally, we prefer using quarterly data to annual data because the latter can be misleading – or not 
informative – if sectoral wage spillovers occur within the year, i.e. with a frequency which is higher 
than that of the sample. As we will show, our estimates of the α coefficients indeed suggest that 
disequilibria in the wage relations are in all cases absorbed within the year. 
As already stated, the empirical model is a Vector Error Correction Model in three variables: (real) 
wages in Industry, wI , Services, wS , and Public Administration, wP . In the majority of cases the 
model is a Cointegrated VAR with an unrestricted constant and no trend, but exceptions are 
present16. Table 2 shows the results of the cointegration rank test. We do not limit ourselves to 
looking at the results of the trace test but, as it is common in the literature, combine it with 
information on the largest unrestricted root of the characteristic polynomial17. When they are 
conflicting, we look at the significance of the adjustment coefficients in the corresponding row of 
the α-matrix to see if they are significant, in order to make sure that, by excluding a cointegration 
relation, we are not wasting potentially important information. 
Only for three countries out of ten (Estonia, Poland and Slovakia) we could not reject the null of a 
rank of 2. In the other cases, the rank is 1. This might suggest a low intersectoral mobility across 
sectors, so that the three wage series do not share a single common trend but two different 
trends. 
We can now move to testing restrictions on the cointegration vectors, the β matrices, in order to 
find out the degree of wage adaptability; on the other hand, by testing restrictions on the α 
matrices (i.e. testing for weak exogeneity) we will be able to classify the variables in the system in 
pushing and pulling forces, i.e. variables that drove the system out of equilibrium and variables 
which brought the system back to equilibrium, adjusting to the cointegration relations. 
Tables 3-5 report the results of the empirical model. Table 3 provides the null hypothesis, the 
imposed restrictions and normalization on the β-vectors and the likelihood test results. If we have 
two cointegration relations and a null hypothesis of one or several one-to-one relations can be 
rejected at the 10% level, we interpret this as low wage adaptability (see Friberg [2007]). 
                                                          
14 The literature generally identifies the open sector with industry and the sheltered sector with services or “all the 
rest”. For example, Egert *2001, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c+ and Golinelli and Orsi *2001] define Industry as the Open sector 
and the rest as the closed sector. Halpern and Wyplosz [2001] include respectively Industry and Services, and exclude 
construction from the latter. Agriculture is excluded in Coricelli and Jazbec [2001], De Broeck and Slot [2001], and 
Rother [2000]. Nenovsky and Dimitrova [2002] include also construction in the open sector. 
 
15
 For example, Lamo et al. [2008] and Demekas and Kontolemis [2000]. Friberg [2007], instead, uses average monthly 
wages in the corresponding sector. 
 
16
 The exact specification of the deterministic part and the order of the underlying VAR, country by country, is given in 
Appendix 2. 
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Table 2. Cointegration rank test results. 
Country Null Trace test p-value Largest unrestricted characteristic root Choice 
Bulgaria r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.028 
0.418 
0.897 
0.294 
0.648 
0.910 
r=1 
Czech Republic r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.018 
0.071 
0.295 
0.349 
0.384 
0.927 
r=1 
Estonia r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.000 
0.005 
0.126 
0.901 
0.846 
0.846 
r=2 
Hungary r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.030 
0.188 
0.380 
0.593 
0.434 
0.771 
r=1 
Latvia r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.026 
0.785 
0.678 
0.415 
0.300 
1.000 
r=1 
Lithuania r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.298 
0.459 
0.064 
0.614 
0.690 
0.877 
r=1 
Poland r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.003 
0.074 
0.183 
0.529 
0.675 
0.659 
r=2 
Romania r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.013 
0.195 
0.567 
0.364 
0.330 
0.722 
r=1 
Slovak Republic r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.001 
0.019 
0.162 
N.A. 
0.237 
0.333 
r=2 
Slovenia r=0 
r≤1 
r≤2 
0.658 
0.682 
0.957 
0.697 
0.706 
0.723 
r=1 
Note: the rank choice suggested by each method is indicated in boldface. 
 
For economic identification and making the vectors meaningful, the vectors were normalized to 
the variable which is adjusting to the corresponding cointegration relation. Table 4 reports the 
results on weak exogeneity (i.e. the “pushing forces” of the system) and table 5 shows the 
common trends representation of the model, where the coefficients to the stochastic trends of 
the system are reported. 
Bulgaria shows only one cointegration relation and Services are weakly exogenous, while the weak 
exogeneity of Industry and Public Sector is rejected; the joint hypothesis of Industry and Services 
being weakly exogenous is rejected at 5% but not at 1%. No restriction on the β vector was 
accepted. Looking at the common trends representation, we see that shocks to industry wages 
had a significant permanent effect only on the industry sector, while shocks to the services sector 
significantly affected the services and public sector. In other words, we can label the two wage 
shocks as a traded goods wage shock and a non-traded sector shock. 
The Czech Republic exhibits one cointegration vector; interestingly, the two closed sector wages, 
wN and wP, are found to be weakly exogenous and the joint weak exogeneity could not be rejected 
with a p-value of 0.113. The traded sector wages, therefore, have been adjusting, and table 4 
shows that the sector that has been leading on industry wages was the public sector.  
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Table 3. Test results for sectoral wage adaptability. 
Country # of Coint. Vectors Restriction/Normalization LR-Statistic p-value 
Bulgaria 1  ̂  [       ]  N.A. N.A. 
Czech Republic 1  ̂  [       ]  N.A. N.A. 
Estonia 2 
 ̂  [
    
    
]   
 ̂  [
      
      
]   
19.259 
 
N.A. 
[0.000] 
 
N.A. 
Hungary 1  ̂  [         ]  3.691 [0.449] 
Latvia 1  ̂  [     ]  0.749 [0.387] 
Lithuania 1  ̂  [       ] N.A. N.A. 
Poland 2 
 ̂  [
    
    
]   
 ̂  [
      
      
]   
15.027 
 
9.184 
[0.036] 
 
[0.102]17 
Romania 1  ̂  [       ]  N.A. N.A. 
Slovak Republic 2  ̂  [
    
    
]   7.589 [0.108] 
Slovenia 1  ̂  [         ]  1.879 [0.598] 
Note: the vectors are normalized on the variable which was found to be significantly adjusting. The order in which 
coefficients appear is always iI, iS , iP. N.A. = not applicable. 
 
This structure of wage spillovers shows a potential for wage costs increasing more than 
productivity and competitiveness loss in the Czech Republic. 
Estonia shows two cointegration relations; however, there is not full wage adaptability since the 
hypothesis of long-run homogeneity is rejected at all significance levels. On the other hand, 
industry wages are weakly exogenous and shocks to this sectors load significantly on the other 
sectors, making the “Scandinavian Model” a good approximation of the functioning of the labor 
market in this country. 
In the case of Hungary only one cointegration vector was found; industry and the public sector 
wages are weakly exogenous and the services sector wages adjust to a cointegration vector that is 
a linear combination of the other two. More interestingly, shocks public sector wages appear not 
to have influenced the other sectors' wages in the long run, while the Services sectors were led by 
Industry wages shocks. 
Latvia has one cointegration relation with the Industry sector being the pulling force, while the 
public and services sector are pushing. Moreover, public sector wages are long-run excludable (i.e. 
the coefficient in the cointegration vector was restricted to zero) but shocks to the public sector 
wages are the only ones that significantly affected the three variables in the system in the long 
run. 
In other words, developments in wages in the public sector led those in other sectors. 
Lithuania presents one cointegration relation; Industry and Services wages are weakly exogenous 
and public sector wages are adjusting. Moreover, from the common trends representation we can 
see that shocks to the industry sector only have a significant long-term effect on that sector, while 
shocks to the services sector significantly affect public sector wages in the long run. 
Poland shows two cointegration relations but the null of full wage adaptability was rejected at all 
significance levels, even when it was tested separately for each cointegration vector. 
                                                          
17
 There are 5 restrictions in this model, and a test on restrictions is therefore available, since we also restricted the 
linear trend to zero in both cointegrating vectors and the trend break to zero in the first vector. 
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Table 4. Test results for weak exogeneity. 
Country Industry Services Public Joint weak exogeneity  test 
Bulgaria 
4.613 
[0.032] 
0.333 
[0.564] 
9.977 
[0.002] 
Industry and Services: 6.826 [0.043] 
Czech Republic 
4.025 
[0.045] 
2.371 
[0.124] 
0.449 
[0.503] 
Services and Public: 4.361 [0.113] 
Estonia 
6.072 
[0.048] 
8.894 
[0.012] 
16.998 
[0.000] 
 
Hungary 
0.029 
[0.865] 
6.094 
[0.014] 
0.692 
[0.405] 
Industry and Public: 0.711 [0.701] 
Latvia 
2.344 
[0.126] 
0.997 
[0.318] 
0.002 
[0.962] 
Industry and Services: 29.101 [0.000] 
Industry and Public: 4.868 [0.088] 
Services and Public: 1.745 [0.418] 
Lithuania 
1.007 
[0.316] 
0.001 
[0.979] 
5.693 
[0.017] 
Industry and Services: 2.159 [0.340] 
Poland 
4.698 
[0.095] 
2.316 
[0.314] 
13.487 
[0.001] 
 
Romania 
12.997 
[0.000] 
4.396 
[0.036] 
0.718 
[0.397] 
Services and Public: 4.778 [0.092] 
Slovak 
Republic 
2.670 
[0.263] 
6.567 
[0.037] 
12.458 
[0.002] 
 
Slovenia 
1.317 
[0.251] 
0.030 
[0.862] 
3.988 
[0.046] 
Industry and Services: 1.857 [0.395] 
LR tests, distributed as 
2
r , where r = number of cointegrating relations. P-values in brackets. 
 
In this case, the services sector wages are found to be weakly exogenous, with shocks to this 
sector pushing the system. 
Romania presents only one cointegration relation with the Services and Public sector being weakly 
exogenous, the joint hypothesis not rejected with a p-value of 0.092. Moreover, as in the case of 
the Czech Republic, shocks to public wages load significantly on industry wages, while the services 
sector does not significantly impact on the other sectors in the long run. 
Interestingly, the Slovak Republic is the only country for which all hypotheses in the Scandinavian 
model and Balassa-Samuelson model (as concerns wage determination) are fulfilled. There are 
two cointegration vectors, full wage adaptability and Industry is weakly exogenous and 
significantly loading onto the other sectors. 
Finally, Slovenia has one cointegration relation, where the public sector wages adjust to a 
weighted average of Industry and the Services, and the latter two sectors being jointly weakly 
exogenous and shocks to these variables significantly affecting public sector wages. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper analysed spillovers in wage determination across sectors in ten european transition 
countries that joined the European Union within the last decade. Several previous studies have 
shown, either with a descriptive approach or using econometric techniques, that wages in 
different sectors generally equalize or, more generally, the wage ratio tends to be constant. 
However, as it was discussed in Section 3 using a stylized theoretical model, different frameworks 
leads and lags in wage determination may have different impacts as regards the international cost 
competitiveness of a country's firms.  
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Table 5. Common Trends representation: estimated elements of the C matrix 
Country Equation 
Shocks 
I S P Det. Trend 
Bulgaria 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
1.146 [2.708] 
0.077 [0.179] 
-0.365 [-0.804] 
0.375 [0.687] 
1.363 [2.463] 
1.771 [3.023] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.009 
0.013 
0.015 
Czech Republic 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.212 [1.540] 
0.849 [3.995] 
0.031 [0.108] 
0.518 [2.018] 
0.286 [0.721] 
1.398 [2.576] 
0.012 
0.011 
0.011 
Estonia 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
    
Hungary 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
1.166 [3.111] 
1.207 [2.690] 
1.448 [1.106] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
-0.010 [-0.167] 
0.109 [1.461] 
0.812 [3.742] 
0.008 
0.008 
0.009 
Latvia 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.378 [0.920] 
0.445 [0.920] 
-1.202 [-0.980] 
0.412 [2.408] 
0.484 [2.408] 
1.961 [3.840] 
0.012 
0.014 
0.005 
Lithuania 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
2.547 [2.152] 
1.660 [1.414] 
0.127 [0.132] 
0.064 [0.067] 
0.953 [1.012] 
1.728 [2.251] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.009 
0.009 
0.006 
Poland 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.653 [4.221] 
0.618 [4.221] 
0.597 [4.221] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.010 
0.009 
0.009 
Romania 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
-0.050 [-0.347] 
0.931 [4.972] 
0.319 [0.932] 
0.333 [3.284] 
0.010 [0.076] 
0.703 [2.914] 
0.020 
0.018 
0.031 
Slovak Republic 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
0.815 [3.277] 
0.774 [3.277] 
0.945 [3.277] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.008 
0.008 
0.009 
Slovenia 
wIt 
wSt 
wPt 
0.442 [2.383] 
-0.193 [-1.052] 
-0.653 [-3.088] 
0.283 [0.802] 
0.932 [2.669] 
1.364 [3.386] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.000 [N.A.] 
0.008 
0.006 
0.003 
T-values in parenthesis. Significant long-run effects of the shocks on the dependent variable are given in boldface. 
 
Table 6. Models of wage spillovers 
 Bulgaria Czech 
Rep. 
Estonia Hungary Latvia Lithuania Poland Romania Slovak 
Rep. 
Slovenia 
Model 1 3 1 1 3 1 2 3 1 1 
Note: 1. Scandinavian Model; 2. Wage mark-up model; 3. Envy-effect model. 
 
When wages in sectors that are not exposed to international competition lead the process of wage 
setting, inter-sectoral labor mobility as well as union pressure will cause the traded sector wages 
to grow more than productivity, thus harming competitiveness. 
In this case, the catching up process will be characterized by wages converging faster than 
productivity, i.e. nominal convergence and real convergence will decouple. The main results of the 
paper are the following: first of all, in transition countries we do not have full wage adaptability, 
and in most cases two common trends are present, meaning that wage setting in the “weakly 
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exogenous” sectors has been, in some sense, autonomous. This means that inter-sectoral labour 
mobility was low. Second, the “right” model to describe wage interactions is different across 
countries. In Section 3, we have outlined three alternative models of wage spillovers and derived 
the hypotheses they implied. Table 6 shows the model that best describes wage setting in each of 
the sample countries, although, given the result on the number of cointegration relations, a 
somehow weaker version of those models holds, since labor mobility was found to be low. 
Only for the case of Slovak Republic the Scandinavian model, which is the dominant model of 
wage spillovers in the literature, was found to hold in its strict version. Romania, the Czech 
Republic and Latvia are in the opposite situation, with public sector wages which were found to be 
weakly exogenous (strongly exogenous in the case of Latvia) and Granger-causing traded and 
nontraded sector wages. 
In the case of Poland, nontraded sector wages have been leading wage determination. For these 
countries, wages and prices have thus been converging at a higher speed with respect to 
productivity, suggesting that international competitiveness might be damaged by the current 
system. 
As far as the remaining countries are concerned, while traded sector wages have been weakly 
exogenous, low inter-sectoral labour mobility made sure that wage setting in the non-traded or 
public sector was not long-run affected by the open sector. 
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Appendix 1. Data Sources 
 
Variable Source and Definition 
Industry Wages Eurostat, LCI (Labor Cost Index) – Wages and Salaries. Seasonally adjusted 
and adjusted data by working days – B-E (“Industry except construction”). 
Nominal value. 
Services Wages Eurostat, LCI (Labor Cost Index) – Wages and Salaries. Seasonally adjusted 
and adjusted data by working days – G-N (“Services of the business 
economy”). Nominal value. 
Public Wages Eurostat, LCI (Labor Cost Index) – Wages and Salaries. Seasonally adjusted 
and adjusted data by working days – O (“Public administration and Defence, 
compulsory social security”). Nominal value. 
Price Adjustment Eurostat, HICP Overall Index – Seasonally and Working day adjusted 
 
Appendix 2. Specification of the empirical model by country. 
 
As it was outlined in section 4, che CVAR can be specified with a constant and a linear trend which 
can be restricted to lie in the cointegration space or left unrestricted. 
In the former case, a restricted constant accounts for a mean of the cointegration relation which is 
different from zero; a restricted trend is included whenever some of the variables in the system 
exhibit a linear trend while others do not or have a trend with a different slope, so that possibly 
the cointegration relation would be trending as well. In the present empirical model, if the 
hypothesis of wage equalization holds, a trend should not be present in the long-run relations. 
However, as it is clear from table A2, we had to include a linear trend in the cointegration relation 
in some countries and for some specific time periods to account for cases when wages in some 
sectors were indeed growing at higher rates than others. While it is not realistic that a trend is 
present over longer periods, we think this is still a good local approximation, while excluding 
cointegration because of the presence of a trend would be a potentially important information 
loss. 
 
Table A2. VECM specification. 
Country n Model Specification 
Bulgaria 1 Unrestricted constant, no trend, transitory dummies (2001Q4, 2009Q4) 
Czech Rep. 2 Unrestricted Constant, restricted trend, shift in 2004Q3. 
Estonia 3 Unrestricted constant, no trend 
Hungary 2 Unrestricted constant, no trend 
Latvia 2 Unrestricted constant, no trend, shift at 2006Q4. 
Lithuania 3 Unrestricted constant, no trend 
Poland 
2 Unrestricted constant, trend break at 2008Q1. The trend break accounts for a 
large increase in the public sector wage bill which occurred throughout the 
economic crisis18. The linear term was restricted to zero in both cointegration 
relations and such restriction could not be rejected (see Table 3). 
Romania 
2 Unrestricted constant, restricted trend. Trend break at 2007Q1, which might 
account for entrance in the E.U. 
Slovak Rep. 1 Unrestricted constant, no trend 
Slovenia 2 Unrestricted constant, no trend 
                                                          
18
 See also: Poland – Public Expenditure review, Vol. I, p. 33 – The World Bank Report No. 52536-PL. 
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